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STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER 
AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant Karen Hepp (“Hepp”), commenced this action 
against Defendants-Appellees Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), Imgur, Inc. 
(“Imgur”), Reddit, Inc. (“Reddit”), Giphy, Inc. (“Giphy”) and WGCZ, 
S.R.O. (“WGCZ”) via Complaint on September 4, 2019 and subsequent 
Amended Complaint on February 18, 20201. Hepp, a local television anchor 
for a FOX-affiliated broadcast company, alleges that Defendants-Appellees 
featured an unauthorized and clearly unflattering photograph of her on their 
respective websites in violation of her statutory and common law right of 
publicity. 
Hepp’s action was commenced in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. §1332, based upon 
diversity of citizenship since Hepp is a Pennsylvania resident; Facebook, 
Imgur and Reddit are Delaware corporations, and WGCZ is a foreign 
company. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 
This appeal is from the Memorandum Opinions and Orders of the 
Honorable John Milton Younge, U.S.D.J.,  upon which judgment was entered 
 
1 Defendant Giphy was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by Hepp on May 13, 
2020. (46a) 






dismissing all of  Hepp’s claims against Facebook, Imgur and Reddit on June 5, 
2020 (3a-17a), on the grounds that the said claims were barred under § 230(c) 
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), and upon subsequent judgment 
entered on August 3, 2020 (18a-34a), dismissing all of Hepp’s claims against 
WGCZ for lack of personal jurisdiction.   
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291, in that this 
appeal is from a final judgment of the District Court. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
(1) Did the Court below err, as a matter of law in this case of first 
impression in this Court, by applying the holding and rationale of Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007), to the instant facts, where, 
in that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that immunity under § 230(c) of the CDA 
extends to state-based intellectual property claims? (13a-15a; 31a) 
(2) Did the Court below err, as a matter of law, with respect to Hepp’s 
motion to amend her amended complaint to join NKL Associates, S.R.O. 
(“NKL”) as party defendant, by finding that such an action would be futile 
because NKL would anyway be immune from state-based intellectual 
property claims under Section 230(c) of the CDA?  (24a; 31a) 
(3) Did the Court below err, as a matter of law, with respect to Hepp’s 






motion to amend her amended complaint to add a count for successor 
liability as against Defendant WGCZ, by finding that such an action would 
be futile because WGCZ would anyway be immune from state-based 
intellectual property claims under Section 230(c) of the CDA?  (24a; 31a) 
(4) Did the Court below err, as a matter of law, in finding that Hepp 
was not entitled to jurisdictional discovery as to Defendant WGCZ despite 
Hepp’s affirmative proofs of successor liability vis-à-vis WGCZ and NKL 
and that XNXX.COM’s activities were purposefully directed toward 
Pennsylvania residents? (29a-30a) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291. Moreover, the Court 
exercises plenary review of the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.  
See Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010); St. Luke’s Health Network, 
Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS 
There are currently no known cases or proceedings pending which are 
related to this appeal. The lower Court has acknowledged that this is a case of 
first impression in this Court as to the issue of whether Section 230(c) of the 






CDA provides immunity from state-based intellectual property claims – 
specifically, those sounding in right of publicity. (8a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hepp filed her right of publicity action on September 4, 2019, asserting in her 
original Complaint claims against Facebook, Imgur, Reddit, Giphy and WCGZ, 
alleging claims for violations of 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I) 
and under the Pennsylvania common law right of publicity (Count II). (6a; 39a, D.E. 
1). Subsequently, Defendants Imgur, Giphy, Reddit and Facebook filed motions to 
dismiss the Complaint, alleging, among other things, Hepp’s failure to state a claim 
under the aforementioned theories. (6a; 41a, 43a, D.E.  29, 45-47).  
  On February 18, 2020, with the motions to dismiss the original Complaint 
pending, Hepp filed an Amended Complaint, renewing her original claims with 
augmented facts supporting her jurisdictional arguments and further expounding 
upon the value of her image with respect to social media metrices.  (49a-177a, D.E. 
50). Appropriately, the lower Court dismissed the motions to dismiss the original 
Complaint as moot. (44a, D.E. 51). In response to the Amended Complaint, 
Defendants Imgur, Reddit, Giphy and Facebook renewed their motions to dismiss. 
(44a, D.E. 53-56). Thereafter, Hepp timely filed her separate replies to Defendants’ 
collective motions to dismiss. (45a, D.E. 58-61).  
In its Opinion and Order of June 5, 2020, while the District Court 






recognizes “a split of authority over the scope of this [Section 230(e)(2) of the 
CDA] exclusion,” the Court nevertheless adopts the holding and rationale of  
Perfect 10 -- the side of authority that favors a contorted interpretation of the 
Section 230(c) of the CDA -- opining that “only federal intellectual property 
claims are excluded from the scope of CDA immunity, and for this reason, 
Plaintiff’s statutory and common law right of publicity claims are barred by § 
230(c) of the CDA.”  (12a,15a). The District Court thus granted Defendants 
Imgur, Reddit and Facebook’s respective motions to dismiss with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim. (16a). For critical reasons grounded in plain-language 
interpretation and public policy, discussed infra, the District Court’s decision to 
rely upon Perfect 10 for stare decisis in this Court is patently misplaced. 
 Procedurally, with respect to Defendant WGCZ, WGCZ filed a subsequent 
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on May 28, 2020. (46a, D.E. 77). On 
June 11, 2020, Hepp, in response, filed a cross-motion to amend her amended 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) to add a count for successor liability as to 
Defendant WGCZ, and to add NKL as a party defendant. (178a-212a, D.E. 83).  In 
its Opinion and Order of August 3, 2020, the District Court granted WGCZ’s 
motion and denied Hepp’s cross-motion, on the grounds of lack of personal 
jurisdiction as to Defendant WGCZ and for failure to state a claim (via adoption 
and application of its prior ruling for Defendants Imgur, Reddit and Facebook) 






as to proposed defendant NKL. (18a-34a, D.E. 85-86).  Assuming, arguendo, 
the District Court erroneously relied upon the rationale of Perfect 10 as to 
Defendants  Imgur, Reddit and Facebook, then by logical conclusion, its application 
to WGCZ and/or NKL is likewise flawed. In addition, the District Court’s stated 
reasons for disallowing Hepp’s claims for successor liability as to Defendant WGCA 
and request for jurisdictional discovery are misplaced, as discussed, infra.  
In light of the District Court’s final ruling as to all parties on August 3, 2020, 
Hepp filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 21, 2020. (la). 
STATEMENT  OF FACTS 
Hepp is a television newscaster who has worked for the Philadelphia-based 
Fox 29 news team since November 2010. (Am. Compl. (hereafter “AC”) ¶ 37, 54a). 
She is a co-anchor of the 4 am to 6 am hours of “Good Day Philadelphia,” a morning 
news program, and joins the set as co-host for the final hour of the show from 9 am 
to 10 am. (Id. ¶ 38, 54a). Prior to working at Fox 29, Hepp worked for other news 
organizations in New York City, Philadelphia and Connecticut. ( Id. ¶¶ 39-41, 55a). 
Hepp alleges that “[a]pproximately two years ago, [she] discovered through 
her co-workers and managers, that, without her consent, a photograph of her taken 
by a security camera in a convenience store in New York City was being used in 
online advertisements for erectile dysfunction and dating websites.” ( Id. ¶ 43, 55a). 
Hepp further alleges that she “was unaware that her photograph had been taken” in 






the store, that she “does not know the identity or the location of the store or how her 
photograph was secured,” and that she “has since learned that the photograph has 
appeared illegally on many other websites.” ( Id. ¶¶ 44-45, 55a). 
With regard to Defendants Facebook, Imgur and Reddit and WGCZ, 
respectively, Hepp alleges as follows: 
• Her photo was featured in a Facebook advertisement soliciting users 
to “meet and chat with single women.” (Id. ¶ 46, Ex. L, 126a-127). 
 
• Her photo was featured on Imgur under the heading “milf,” which      
is a derogatory and degrading slang acronym that refers to a sexually 
attractive woman with young children. (Id. ¶ 47, Ex. M, 128a-129a). 
 
• Her photo was featured on Reddit site on a page titled “Amazing” in 
the subgroup r/obsf (“older but still $#^@able”) and posted by a user 
known as “pepsi_next.”  (Id. ¶ 48, Ex. N, 130a-139a). 
 
• Her photo was featured on the XNXX.com website in the milf gallery 
44/46.  (Id. ¶ 50, Ex. P, 142a-143a). 
 
 
Furthermore, Hepp submits that she has built a considerable following of her 
image/brand on social media sites over the past years. (Id. ¶ 51, 56a). For example, 
on her Instagram page, Hepp currently has 22,500 followers and regularly posts to 
that site. (Id. ¶ 51, Ex. Q, 57a, 144a-148a). Hepp enjoys a considerable Twitter 
following (almost 30,000 followers) and in many of her highly watched tweeted 
images, she is featured with her co-anchors, Thomas Drayton, Alex Holley, Mike 
Jerrick and countless celebrities, including, but not limited to, John Travolta, Vivica 
Fox and soccer star Carli Lloyd. (Id. ¶ 53, Ex. R, 57a, 149a-164a).  






In terms of measuring the impact of Hepp’s online presence, her daily social 
media posting activity reaches thousands of online viewers. (Id. ¶ 54, Ex. S, 57a, 
165a-172a). Hepp’s employer, Fox 29 News and its brand, usually controls over 
50% of the market share for social media presence in the region, and Hepp typically 
scores among the leading personalities who are employed by Fox 29 News. As of 
February 11, 2020, Hepp had an SEI (“social equity score”) of 67.7, which is on the 
higher scale for the network affiliate.  (Id. ¶ 55, Ex. T, 57a, 173a-177a). 
Hepp further contends that she is “a well-known public figure who has spent 
years honing her skills as a professional television broadcaster,” “is well-regarded 
in the Philadelphia community and has earned an excellent reputation as a moral and 
upstanding community leader and public person,” and, as a result, “[h]er image, both 
on television and on social media, has high intrinsic commercial value.” (Id. ¶¶ 57-
59, 57a-58a). Hepp’s harm is rooted in Defendants Facebook, Reddit, Imgur and 
WGCZ’s usurpation of her image, which has commercial value, and is “instantly 
identifiable and automatically associated with Plaintiff’s professional persona.”  (Id. 
¶¶ 60,62, 58a). The resultant damages stem from Defendants Facebook, Reddit, 
Imgur and WGCZ’s  sexualization of Hepp’s image and its use for “prurient and 
illicit purposes,” an unfortunate consequence that has caused “serious, permanent 
and irreparable harm to [her] image and reputation.”   (Id. ¶¶ 63-64, 58a). The thrust 
of Hepp’s claim sounds in Defendants’ violations of her statutory and common law 






right of publicity, which is squarely a creature of intellectual property law.  
 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hepp, a seasoned television broadcaster with Fox-29 News, brought this 
diversity action against Defendants Facebook, Imgur, Reddit and WGCZ, alleging 
violations of her statutory and common law right of publicity based upon 
Defendants’ unsanctioned posting of an unflattering and illicit photograph of her that 
appeared on their respective websites.  (6a, 39a, 55a).  
Despite Hepp’s articulated claims, the District Court dismissed her action for 
failure to state a claim, reasoning that under the doctrine promulgated in the Ninth 
Circuit’s case of Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 
2007),  § 230(e)(2) of the CDA, which exempts intellectual property claims from the 
safe-harbor of § 230(c) of the CDA, does not apply to state-based right of publicity 
claims.  
The District Court’s holding raises an issue of first impression in this Court. 
Effectively, if upheld, the District Court’s decision stands to nullify any and all state-
based intellectual property claims brought against Internet-based companies in this 
Court. The District Court rests in decision on two major grounds: 1) statutory 
uniformity for state-based intellectual property claims and 2) public policy 






supporting the free exchange of ideas and enterprise on the Internet. As Hepp will 
show, infra, statutory uniformity is neither necessary nor required for the proper 
interpretation of various states’ intellectual property laws and the public policy 
considerations protecting a once nascent Internet are no longer applicable. To the 
contrary, Internet companies, such as Defendants Facebook, Imgur, Reddit and 
WGCZ, are now using the shield of § 230(c) of the CDA as a sword against 
professionals like Hepp, who are merely attempting to protect their coveted brands 
from unauthorized and harmful attacks to their collective public persona on the 
Internet.  
There are alternative holdings to Perfect 10, such as the one in Atlantic 
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
that employs a plain-language interpretation to suggest that Congress’s use of the 
modifier “any” in § 230(e)(2) means exempting state-based or federal intellectual 
property law from § 230(c) of the CDA. Such an interpretation would be consistent 
with maintaining state-based right of publicity claims against Internet-based 
companies.  
As to Hepp’s arguments relative to the District Court’s dismissal of her claims 
against WGCZ, Hepp asserts that the District Court erred in finding that her motions 
to amend her amended complaint to add a new party, NKL, and add an addition 
count for successor liability against WGCZ were futile. The District Court’s futility 






finding was based upon his prior June 5, 2020 ruling as it pertains to § 230(c). Should 
this Court decide not to adopt the Perfect 10 holding, then the District Court’s futility 
assumption must fail a fortiori. Similarly, Hepp should be entitled to discovery. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE BARRED BY 
SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT. 
 
In this important case of first impression in this Court, the District Court 
erroneously concluded that § 230 of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c),  bars all of Hepp’s 
statutory and common law right of publicity claims, which are typically considered 
state-based intellectual property claims. (14a-15a). While it is true that § 230(c) of 
the CDA provides a safe-harbor for Internet service providers (“ISPs”) and website 
operators for certain kinds of actions, there is another section of the CDA, § 
230(e)(2), wherein Congress expressly provided that “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”  Id.  
A. The Perfect 10 Case should not be adopted in this Court as Perfect 
10’s logic is faulty and its public policy rationale anachronistic. 
 
At the outset of its decision, the District Court acknowledges the split of 
federal common law authority as to whether § 230(e)(2) of the CDA preserves state-
based intellectual property claims (e.g., state-based right of publicity claims): 
[T]he Court recognizes there that there is a split of authority over 
the scope of this exclusion. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). Specifically, 
there is disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and some district courts 
over whether the CDA preempts state law intellectual property claims. 






Compare, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the CDA preempted a state right of 
publicity claim); Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, 
Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We have observed before 
that because Congress did not define the term ‘intellectual property 
law,’ it should be construed narrowly to advance the CDA’s express 
policy of providing broad immunity.”); with Doe v. Friendfinder 
Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008) (holding that 
the CDA did not preempt plaintiff’s right of publicity claim); Atlantic 
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Section 230(c)(1) does not provide immunity for 




The District Court goes on to concede that there is general ambiguity and 
inconsistency among other appellate courts, including this Court, which has only 
looked at the issue tangentially, as to whether the CDA preempts right of publicity 
claims:  
Moreover, the Court’s research has yielded no case law from any 
other appellate courts that has clearly resolved whether the CDA 
preempts right of publicity claims. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 26 n.9 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting the 
split of authority over whether the CDA preempts right of publicity 
claims but not taking a position where plaintiffs’ claims failed 
otherwise on the merits); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 
1323-24 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing but not deciding the “difficult 
issues” of whether the CDA applies to a right of publicity claim, even 
though “there appears to be no dispute that the right of publicity is a 
type of intellectual property right”). Further, the Court’s research has 
revealed no district court opinion within the Third Circuit that has 
squarely determined the issue. See, e.g., Parker v. Paypal, No. 16-4786, 
2017 WL 3508759, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2017) (holding, without 
discussing § 230(e)(2), that plaintiff’s claim for right of publicity under 
California law was “clearly preempted and prohibited by § 230”); 
Obado, at *7 n.5 (noting the Ninth Circuit’s position but finding that 






the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a right of publicity violation and 
therefore it was unnecessary to decide whether the claim was excluded 
from CDA preemption); but see Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., No. 
13-2477, 2013 WL 4426359, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (holding 
plaintiff’s claim under Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute 
preempted by the CDA). 
 
(Id., 12a-13a, n. 8). 
 
Given then, its judicial discretion to fashion a holding, the District Court, 
“persuaded by the reasoning in Perfect 10,” adopts said holding based upon statutory 
uniformity and public policy goals: 
State laws that could arguably be construed as implicating 
“intellectual property” vary and are not uniform in their purposes and 
policy goals. Conditioning CDA immunity on the diverse potentially 
applicable state laws would have a negative effect on the development 
of the internet, and, therefore, would run contrary to the purpose and 
intent of the CDA. 
… 
In this Court’s view, construing § 230(e)(2) as preserving only federal 
intellectual property claims is most fitting because this interpretation 
simultaneously maintains broad immunity in line with the CDA’s stated 
congressional purpose. This preserves the scope of immunity within a 
predictable body of federal law as opposed to the diverse state law on 
the subject matter. See Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 946 F.3d at 
1053 (holding “that the intellectual property exception contained in § 
230(e)(2) encompasses claims pertaining to an established intellectual 
property right under federal law, like those inherent in a patent, 
copyright, or trademark”). 
  
(Id., 14a-15a). 
In its decision, the District Court mentions a central case cited by Hepp for 
the proposition that Perfect 10’s arrant sidestepping of the CDA’s plain-language  is 
erroneous. (Id., 14a). See Atlantic Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 703-04. 






Atlantic Recording Corp., along with key decisions from other circuits, crystalize 
the semantic overreaching and interpretive legerdemain of Perfect 10’s errant 
statutory construction.  As the Atlantic Recording court astutely opined: 
The problem with Playlist’s argument is that it lacks any support in the 
plain language of the CDA. In four different points in Section 230(e), 
Congress specified whether it intended a subsection to apply to local, 
state, or federal law. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(e)(1) (“any other Federal 
criminal statute”), (3) (“any State law” and “any State or local law”), 
(4) (“any similar State law”) (emphasis added in all). It is therefore clear 
from the statute that if Congress wanted the phrase “any law pertaining 
to intellectual property” to actually mean “any federal law pertaining to 
intellectual property,” it knew how to make that clear, but chose not to. 
Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452, 122 S.Ct. 941, 
151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) ( “[I]t is a general principle of statutory 
construction that when Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); United States v. Gonzales, 520 
U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (holding that “any 
other term of imprisonment” includes both state and federal terms of 
imprisonment because “Congress did not add any language limiting the 
breadth of that word, and so we must read [the statute] as referring to 
all ‘terms of imprisonment’”). 
  
Moreover, the modifier “any” in Section 230(e)(2), employed without 
any limiting language, “amounts to ‘expansive language [that] offers 
no indication whatever that Congress intended [a] limiting 
construction.’” Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F.Supp.2d 288, 
299 (D.N.H.2008) (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 589, 
100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980)). This conclusion is bolstered 
by the fact that, as discussed above, the “surrounding statutory 
language” supports the conclusion that Congress intended the word 
“any” to mean any state or federal law pertaining to intellectual 
property. See ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir.2008) 
(holding that word “any” in statute “deserves an expansive application 
where the surrounding statutory language and other relevant legislative 
context support it”). 







Because the plain language of the CDA is clear, as “any law” means 
both state and federal law, the Court need not engage in an analysis of 
the CDA’s legislative history or purpose. See Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 
166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir.1999) (“It is axiomatic that the plain meaning 
of a statute controls its interpretation and that judicial review must end 
at the statute’s unambiguous terms. Legislative history and other tools 
of interpretation may be relied upon only if the terms of the statute are 
ambiguous.”) (internal citations omitted). 
  
Accordingly, I conclude, as a matter of law, that Section 230(c)(1) does 
not provide immunity for either federal or state intellectual property 
claims. See Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F.Supp.2d 288 at 302 
(rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 and holding that 
“[c]onsistent with its text, § 230(e)(2) applies simply to ‘any law 
pertaining to intellectual property,’ not just federal law.”); Murawski v. 
Pataki, 514 F.Supp.2d 577, 591 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (reading 230(c)(1) to 
“immunize[ ] internet service providers from defamation and other, 
non-intellectual property, state law claims arising from third-party 
content”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.Supp.2d 409, 415 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The instant claims are grounded in the law of 
intellectual property and, therefore, do not, on a motion to dismiss, 
implicate Section 230 immunity.”); Universal Commc’n Sys. v. Lycos, 
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422-23 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating, in dicta, that 
“[c]laims based on intellectual property laws are not subject to Section 
230 immunity.”). 
 
 Id. at 703-4. 
 
Although dismissive of Atlantic Recording, supra, and its highly elucidating 
exegesis, the District Court offers no countervailing explanation – as a matter of pure 
statutory construction – as to why § 230(e)’s inclusion of “any law pertaining to 
intellectual property” does not apply to state-based right of publicity laws. As there 
is no ambiguity of statutory interpretation here, there is no need for the District Court 
to further consider judicial review based upon public policy considerations. See Lee 






v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir.1999). 
However, assuming arguendo, the District Court’s public policy concerns, 
they are likewise misplaced. First, the District Court’s concern that state-based 
intellectual property laws “vary and are not uniform in their purposes and policy 
goals” belies an entire cannon of diverse federal “common law.” (14a). Under 
diversity and ancillary jurisdiction, federal district courts make daily decisions 
interpreting admittedly varied and divergent state statutes and common law 
regarding intellectual property law. In such cases, federal district courts necessarily 
must opine upon laws that are not uniform from one state to another, an act that, in 
itself, defies predictability.  But the fact that these decisions are potentially 
anomalous does not vitiate the clear intent of  § 230(e) of the CDA. Nor should the 
Court be concerned with promoting predictability among state-based intellectual 
property law decision-making that stems from the federal courts.  
Likewise, the District Court’s reservation that recognition of a state-based 
right of publicity exception to the CDA would “have a negative effect on the 
development of the internet” reflects an outdated policy concern. (14a). In 2007, 
when Perfect 10 was decided, the Internet with its concomitant limitless potential 
for opening portals for commerce, public discourse, science, education and other 
areas, was in its adolescence.  Today, the Internet’s technological landscape has 
changed drastically. While it may be true that the protections afforded Internet-based 






companies under §230 of the CDA initially played a crucial role in creating what is 
now the modern Internet, the pendulum has swung fully, and Internet companies that 
have openly relied upon §230 of the CDA since its codification have seen a recent 
flourish of calls from both the executive and legislative branches of government 
either to abolish the statute outright or reform it for varying unrelated reasons, the 
scope of which falls outside of this Brief. (See, e.g., 9a-10a, n. 7). 
As for professional broadcasters such as Hepp, the District Court’s holding is 
clear:  In a call to all Internet-based companies, the death knell of Pennsylvania’s 
right of publicity has been rung. Hepp’s keen economic interest lies in the 
commercial value attributed to her honed professional identity, which is exactly the 
interest a right of publicity is intended to protect. (See Hepp AC ¶¶ 51,53-54,55; 
56a-57a, 144a-148a,149a-164a). With clear immunity from any liability for right of 
publicity violations, Defendants Imgur, Reddit, Facebook and WGCZ have no 
incentive to monitor and/or remove protected materials from their sites – despite the 
fact that such an exercise may be accomplished at relatively low cost given the 
current technology. Moreover, anathema to individual property rights is the notion 
that Hepp, who has dedicated considerable time, effort and money into building her 
brand, is effectively disenfranchised by the District Court’s ruling.    
II. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
HOLDING THAT IMMUNITY UNDER § 230(C) OF THE CDA 
APPLIES TO STATE-BASED RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS,  
ITS RELATIONAL RULING THAT HEPP’S MOTION TO 






AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NKL AS A PARTY 
DEFENDANT IS FUTILE IS THEREFORE IN ERROR AS WELL 
BY IMPLICATION.  
 
Grounding its decision upon its prior June 5, 2020 ruling -- that § 230(c) of 
the CDA bars Hepp’s statutory and common law right of publicity claims -- the 
District Court found that “further amendment of [her] pleadings would be futile,” 
thus curtailing Hepp’s attempt to add NKL as a party defendant. (31a). Assuming 
the fallacy in in the District Court’s prior ruling, a fortiori, its characterization of 
Hepp’s motion to amend as “futile” is in error.  
The District Court articulated the standard for allowing amendments to 
pleadings as follows: 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) has been interpreted to 
liberally allow for the amendment of pleadings when justice so 
requires; however, this privilege is not unfettered. Foman v. Davis, 371 
U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Under certain circumstances, the denial of a 
motion to amend is appropriate. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 
864 (3d Cir. 1984). “Among the grounds that could justify a denial of 
leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, 
and futility.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1434 (3d Cir. 1997). In “assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies 
the same standard of legal sufficiency” used in 12(b)(6) motions. Id. 
Accordingly, the court must “accept as true all the facts alleged in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
them,”and deny a motion to amend only “where it is certain that no 
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved.” 




Assuming the District Court has not satisfied the “futility” element per 






Gould, supra, its subsequent decision to dismiss Hepp’s motion should be 
reversed and remanded so that the record can be developed as to said claim.  
 
 
 III.ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN    
HOLDING THAT IMMUNITY UNDER § 230(C) OF THE CDA 
APPLIES TO STATE-BASED RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS,  
ITS RELATIONAL RULING THAT HEPP’S MOTION TO 
AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD A COUNT FOR 
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AS TO DEFENDANT WGCZ IS 
FUTILE IS THEREFORE IN ERROR AS WELL BY 
IMPLICATION.  
 
Grounding its decision upon its prior June 5, 2020 ruling -- that § 230(c) of 
the CDA bars Hepp’s statutory and common law right of publicity claims -- the 
District Court found that “further amendment of [her] pleadings would be futile,” 
thus curtailing Hepp’s attempt to amend her complaint to add a count for successor 
liability as to Defendant WGCZ. (31a). Assuming the fallacy in in the District 
Court’s prior ruling, a fortiori, its characterization of Hepp’s motion to amend as 
“futile” is in error.  
The District Court articulated the standard for allowing amendments to 
pleadings as follows: 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) has been interpreted to 
liberally allow for the amendment of pleadings when justice so 
requires; however, this privilege is not unfettered. Foman v. Davis, 371 
U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Under certain circumstances, the denial of a 
motion to amend is appropriate. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 






864 (3d Cir. 1984). “Among the grounds that could justify a denial of 
leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, 
and futility.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1434 (3d Cir. 1997). In “assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies 
the same standard of legal sufficiency” used in 12(b)(6) motions. Id. 
Accordingly, the court must “accept as true all the facts alleged in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
them,”and deny a motion to amend only “where it is certain that no 
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved.” 




Assuming the District Court has not satisfied the “futility” element per 
Gould, supra, its subsequent decision to dismiss Hepp’s motion should be 
reversed and remanded so that the record can be developed as to said claim.  
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT HEPP WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY AS TO 
DEFENDANT WGCZ  
 
With respect to its ruling on jurisdictional discovery, the District Court 
found as follows: 
Plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery because 
she has failed to plausibly plead facts or identify any evidence to 
make a threshold showing that specific personal jurisdiction 
exists over WGCZ. Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating 
facts that support personal jurisdiction. Pinker, 292 F.3d at 368. 
Jurisdictional discovery is proper if the plaintiff has made a 
prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. Toys “R” 
Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003). To 
satisfy this showing, Plaintiff must present “factual allegations 
that suggest ‘with reasonable particularity’ the possible existence 
of the requisite ‘contacts between [the party] and the forum 
state,’” Id. at 456. If a plaintiff presents factual allegations that 
satisfy this standard, “the plaintiff’s right to conduct 






jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.’” Id. 
 
Based upon the following arguments, Hepp maintains that she has pleaded 
facts sufficient to show that WGCZ (through successor liability) in operating the 
XNXX.com website to warrant additional jurisdictional discovery. 
A. Hepp Meets the Zippo Sliding Scale Test 
This Court has established that personal jurisdiction may be exercised based 
on a defendant’s internet presence. See Ackourney v. Sonallas Custom Tailors, 573 
F. App’x 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Determining if personal jurisdiction 
exists requires the court to determine whether the defendant established minimum 
contacts through cyberspace. See Ackourney, 573 F. App’x at 211 (citing Zippo, 952 
F. Supp. at 1121); see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d at 452. 
(“[Zippo] has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon 
the operation of an internet website.”).  
When analyzing these cases, courts must look to the “nature and quality of 
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the internet.” See Zippo, 952 F. 
Supp. at 1124. Accordingly, there exists a sliding scale that ranges from situations 
where a defendant uses an interactive commercial website actively to transact 
business with residents of a forum state (personal jurisdiction exists) to situations 
where a passive website merely provides information that is accessible to users in 






the forum state (personal jurisdiction does not exist). See Ackourney, 573 F. App’x 
at 211. 
To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists for situations between these 
extremes, the court must examine “the level of interactivity and commercial nature 
of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.” Id.; see also Toys “R” 
Us, 318 F.3d at 452. Additionally, the court must determine whether a defendant 
“purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of engaging in activity in that state. See 
Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 451. A defendant has “purposefully availed” itself if its 
website repeatedly attracts business from a forum or knowingly conducts business 
with the forum state’s residents via its site. Id. at 452; Doe v. Hesketh, 15 F. Supp. 
3d 586, 597 (E.D. Pa 2014) (stating that “the Zippo sliding scale requires some 
evidence of commercial interactivity with the forum state as where the Zippo 
defendants solicited subscribers and entered into contracts to furnish services to 
Pennsylvania customers”); see also UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. United Health 
Services, Inc., Civ. No. 12-00485, 2013 WL 12086321, at 9 (M.D. Pa Mar. 26, 2013) 
(“[T]he hallmark of a commercial site is not, ... the users submission or receipt of 
information, but the clear presence of deliberate and repeated online business 
transactions through which the host provides a good or service in return for monetary 
compensation.”). 
In the instant case, it is clear that the quality and nature of WGCZ’s internet 






activity falls at the interactive end of the Zippo spectrum: Its website, xnxx.com, 
“has recently been rated the 181st most visited site globally, the 157th most visited 
site in the United States, and receives about 16.3 million unique visitors per month 
in the United States.” (See Fineman Decl.¶8, Ex.C; 200a). 
Since WGCZ actively transacts business over the internet by providing an 
interactive pornographic website that allows users to download millions of 
pornographic images and videos (ostensibly for many Pennsylvania residents), this 
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper. See Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985). (“We have emphasized that parties who reach 
out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with the 
citizens of another state are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other State for 
the consequences of their activities.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Zippo, 
952 F. Supp. at 1126 (finding jurisdiction when a defendant used a website to 
“contact with 3,000 individuals and seven internet access providers in 
Pennsylvania”); see also Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., v. Tatro, 153 F. Supp. 
3d, 714, 720-21 (E.D. Pa Dec. 29, 2015) (“[Defendant’s] website falls closer to the 
interactive end of the Zippo spectrum ... visitors can search for various resources ... 
[and] have the opportunity to purchase all these resources directly through the 
website.”); Square D Co. v. Scott Elec. Co., Civ. No. 06-00459, 2008 WL 4462298, 
at 8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008) (ruling that website that required customers to provide 






phone number and e-mail address to engage in commercial activity supports 
exercising of jurisdiction under Zippo analysis). 
B. WGCZ PURPOSELY AVAILED ITSELF 
Moreover, WGCZ “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of engaging 
in activity in Pennsylvania through continually providing an interactive platform by 
which Pennsylvanians  upload and download millions of  pornographic images and 
videos. (See Fineman Decl.¶8, Ex.C.; 200a); see also Law Sch. Admission Council, 
153 F. Supp. 3d at 720-21 (finding that a defendant had “purposefully availed” itself 
of activity in Pennsylvania when Pennsylvania residents made approximately 250 
purchases on the defendant’s website); R.Q.C. Ltd. v. JKM Enters., Inc., Civ. No. 
13-307, 2014 WL 4792148, at 4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2014) (“[A] defendant that 
intentionally conducts business transactions over an interactive website with 
customers in the forum state has purposefully directed itself of the laws of that 
forum.”); Gentex Corp. v. Abbott, 978 F. Supp. 2d 391, 398 (M.D. P. a. 2013) 
(finding that a defendant had “availed himself” to the forum state when “Defendant’s 
website allowed Pennsylvania residents to make purchases through the site; it was 
actually utilized to purchase a product that was subsequently shipped into 
Pennsylvania”). Presumably, WGCZ tracks and retains metrices on how many 
“hits,” downloads and click-throughs it receives for its Pennsylvania-based 
subscribers and viewers. Based on the foregoing, Hepp submits that she has made a 






prima facie case warranting jurisdictional contacts premised upon successor liability. 
 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff, Karen Hepp, respectfully submits 
that the District Court’s Orders of June 5, 2020 and August 3, 2020, respectively, 
dismissing her claims with prejudice in this action against Defendants, 
Facebook, Inc., Imgur, Inc., Reddit, Inc. and WGCZ, S.R.O., on the basis of 
statutory immunity under § 230(c) of the CDA, constituted fatal legal error. 
Hepp’s appeal should therefore be granted, the District Court’s Order dismissing 
her claims against all Defendants should be reversed, and this case should be 
remanded so that Hepp can continue to prosecute her claims against Defendants-
Appellees in the District Court below. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
Samuel B. Fineman, Esq. 
COHEN FINEMAN, LLC 
 
Dated:  December 7, 2020 By: /s/Samuel B. Fineman 
                                                               SAMUEL. B. FINEMAN (75717) 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
KAREN HEPP,    :     
      :  
Plaintiff   : 
      : CIVIL ACTION 
v.     :  
      : NO. 19-4034-JMY 
FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,  : 
      : 




YOUNGE, J.                                JUNE 5, 2020 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case arises out of the use of an allegedly unauthorized photograph of Plaintiff Karen 
Hepp, captured by a security camera in a New York City convenience store, that was then posted 
by third-party users on the respective websites and social media platforms of Defendants 
Facebook, Inc.; Imgur, Inc.; Reddit, Inc.; Giphy, Inc.; and foreign Defendant WCGZ, S.R.O.  
(See Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 50.)  Plaintiff asserts that she is a public 
figure who has suffered harm from the unlawful dissemination and publication of her image, and 
accordingly, she contends that Defendants have violated her common law and statutory right of 
publicity.   
Defendants Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit have each filed Motions to Dismiss (“MTD”) 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting, inter alia, immunity 
under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.1  (See Imgur MTD and 
 
 1 Giphy also filed a Motion to Dismiss (Giphy MTD, ECF No. 55).  However, on May 13, 2020, 
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Giphy from this lawsuit with prejudice.  (ECF No. 74.)  Accordingly, 
Giphy’s Motion is no longer before the Court. 
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Mem., ECF Nos. 53, 53-1; Reddit MTD and Mem., ECF Nos. 54, 54-1; Facebook MTD, ECF 
No. 56 (collectively the “Motions to Dismiss”).)  The Court finds this matter appropriate for 
resolution without oral argument.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7.1(f).  For the reasons that follow, 
the Motions to Dismiss will be granted based on CDA immunity.2   
II. BACKGROUND 
 A. Factual Background3 
 Plaintiff is a newscaster who has worked for the Philadelphia-based Fox 29 news team 
since November 2010.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.)  She “is a co-anchor of the 4 am to 6 am hours of 
 
 As to Defendant WGCZ S.R.O., the Amended Complaint alleges that it is “is a limited liability 
company existing under the laws of the Czech Republic” that “owns and operates ‘XNXX.com,’ a 
popular adult-oriented website featuring pornographic materials.”  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.)  WGCZ 
S.R.O.’s counsel executed a waiver of service on February 28, 2020.  (See ECF No. 68.)  On May 28, 
2020, WGCZ S.R.O. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), 
asserting lack of personal jurisdiction.  (See WGCZ S.R.O. MTD, ECF No. 77.))  Plaintiff’s response to 
WGCZ S.R.O.’s Motion is not due until June 11, 2020, (see Local Rule 7.1(c).). Because this Motion is 
not yet ripe, it is not addressed in this Memorandum. 
 
2 Imgur’s and Reddit’s Motions to Dismiss also assert that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction 
because the Amended Complaint does not allege any suit-related contacts with this forum by either of 
these Defendants.  (See Imgur Mem. 4-10 and Reddit Mem. 9-12.)  However, because Plaintiff’s claims 
fail for the reason stated infra, the Court need not address personal jurisdiction over these Defendants.  
See, e.g., 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067.6 (4th ed. 
2020) (“Alternatively, when the jurisdictional question is complex or difficult, a court simply may avoid 
the issue by resolving the suit on the merits when they clearly must be decided in favor of the party 
challenging jurisdiction, thereby obviating any need to decide the question; that approach is possible even 
when the jurisdictional issue lacks complexity.”); In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices 
Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277, 329 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“To streamline the decision making, courts, in 
situations where complex issues of personal jurisdiction exist and there is a pending motion which would 
be dispositive in favor of the party over whom jurisdiction is disputed, may defer ruling on the motion to 
dismiss and proceed to resolve the dispositive motion.”); see also Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 
586, 593 n.2 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Because the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety on the grounds of 
CDA immunity and failure to state claims, we need not address Grindr Holding’s and KL Grindr’s 
personal jurisdiction arguments.”). 
 
3 The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are accepted as true and construed in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party.  DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262-
63 (3d Cir. 2008).  The Court also adopts the CM/ECF docketing system pagination. 
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‘Good Day Philadelphia,’ a morning news program, and joins the set as co-host for the final hour 
of the show from 9 am to 10 am.”  (Id. ¶ 38.)  Prior to working at Fox 29, Plaintiff worked for 
other news organizations in New York City, Philadelphia, and Connecticut.  (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.)   
 Plaintiff alleges that “[a]pproximately two years ago, [she] discovered through her co-
workers and managers, that, without her consent, a photograph of her taken by a security camera 
in a convenience store in New York City was being used in online advertisements for erectile 
dysfunction and dating websites.”   (Id. ¶ 43.)  Plaintiff further alleges that she “was unaware that 
her photograph had been taken” in the store, that she “does not know the identity or the location 
of the store or how her photograph was secured,” and that she “has since learned that the 
photograph has appeared illegally on many other websites.”  (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.)   
 With regard to the moving Defendants, Plaintiff alleges as follows: 
 “[Her] photo was featured in a Facebook advertisement soliciting users to ‘meet and chat 
with single women.’”  (Id. ¶ 46.)  
 “[Her] photo was featured on Imgur under the heading ‘milf,’ which is a derogatory and 
degrading slang acronym that refers to a sexually attractive woman with young children.”  
(Id. ¶ 47.)  
 “[Her] photo was featured on Reddit titled ‘Amazing’ in the subgroup r/obsf (‘older but 
still $#^@able’) and posted by a user known as ‘pepsi_next.’  There is a hyperlink for the 
photograph which links to the Imgur site.” (Id. ¶ 48.)  
The Amended Complaint also references and attaches as exhibits images and internet addresses 
of the websites on which her image appeared.4  (Id. ¶¶ 46-48, Exs. L-M.)  Significantly, the 
Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendants Facebook, Imgur, or Reddit created, 
authored, or directly published the content that is the subject of this lawsuit.  (See generally, Am. 
Compl.)   
 
4 These exhibits and internet addresses include those related to former Defendant Giphy, which 
has been dismissed from this action. 
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 Plaintiff alleges that the unauthorized dissemination of her image impacts her 
“image/brand on social media sites” and her “social media ranking” on sites such as Instagram 
and Twitter.  (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 51-55.)  In the specific counts of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 
alleges that “Defendants’ actions with respect to [her] image have caused serious, permanent and 
irreparable harm” to “Plaintiff’s reputation, brand and image.”  (Id. ¶ 71; see also id. ¶ 64.) 
 B. Procedural History 
 Plaintiff filed this action on September 4, 2019, asserting in her original Complaint 
claims against Facebook, Imgur, Reddit, Giphy, WCGZ, S.R.O., and Does 1-10,5 alleging a 
claim for violation of 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I), and a claim under the 
Pennsylvania common law right of publicity (Count II).  (Compl., ECF No. 1.)  Subsequently, 
Defendants Imgur, Giphy, Reddit, and Facebook filed motions to dismiss the Complaint. (See 
ECF Nos. 29, 45, 46, 47.)   
 On February 18, 2020, while the motions to dismiss the original Complaint were pending, 
Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint, again asserting claims against the above-noted 
Defendants under 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I), and the Pennsylvania 
common law right of publicity (Count II).  (See generally Am. Compl.)  Accordingly, the Court 
dismissed the motions to dismiss the original Complaint as moot.  (See ECF No. 51.)  In 
response to the Amended Complaint, Defendants Imgur, Reddit, and Facebook filed the Motions 
that are the subject of this Memorandum. 6    
 
 5 Plaintiff alleges that the Doe Defendants are “the owners and operators of other websites and/or 
media outlets” who either performed the acts alleged, “acted as agents, principals, alter egos, employees, 
or representatives of the other Defendants,” or “otherwise participated in the acts alleged with the other 
Defendants.”  (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) 
 
 6 When the motions to dismiss the original Complaint were filed, Plaintiff had not yet 
demonstrated proof of service of the Complaint on the foreign Defendant, WCGZ, S.R.O.  (See ECF Nos. 
34, 43.)  Plaintiff later effected service upon WCGZ, S.R.O. pursuant to the Hague Convention and, as 
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III. LEGAL STANDARD 
The motion to dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is set 
forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  After Iqbal, it is clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to 
defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  Id. at 678; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  “To survive dismissal, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Tatis v. Allied Interstate, 
LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).  Facial plausibility is 
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678).  Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).  
 Our Court of Appeals requires us to apply a three-step analysis under a 12(b)(6) motion: 
(1) “[the district court] must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a 
claim;” (2) “it should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth;’” and, (3) “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual 
allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 
give rise to an entitlement to relief.”  Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).  The plausibility determination is a “context-specific 
 
noted above, its counsel executed a waiver of service.  (See ECF Nos. 52, 68.)  The current Motions to 
Dismiss were filed before Defendant WCGZ, S.R.O.’s response to the Amended Complaint was due.  As 
further noted above, WCGZ, S.R.O. has since filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, which 
Motion is not yet ripe for decision. 
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task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The moving Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s statutory and common law right of 
publicity claims are barred by § 230(c) of the CDA.  (See ECF Nos. 53-1 at 15-18, 54-1 at 20-22, 
and 56-1 at 9-16.)  Recognizing that § 230(c) creates a safe harbor for internet service providers, 
Plaintiff argues that § 230(e)(2) carves out an exception for claims pertaining to state intellectual 
property rights.  (See ECF No. 61 at 2.)  This presents an issue of first impression not yet decided 
by our Third Circuit—whether CDA immunity extends to cases alleging infringement by an 
internet service provider in violation of the various and differing state right of publicity laws. 
A. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
The CDA states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider,” and expressly preempts any state law to the contrary.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3).  
In other words, internet service providers are not liable for third-party content.  Section 230 
“creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of the service.”  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470-71 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Under the statute there are, however, certain causes of action that are specifically not 
barred by § 230(c), including “any law pertaining to intellectual property.”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(2).  
“Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet 
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a 
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minimum.”  Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330.  In fact, many courts have observed that § 230 immunity 
should be broadly construed so as to implement Congress’s policy choice.  See Saponaro v. 
Grindr, LLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 319, 325 (D.N.J. 2015) (“[T]he CDA manifests a Congressional 
policy supporting broad immunity.”).  In enacting the CDA, Congress stressed that “[t]he 
Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity.”  42 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).  The statute further reads that the “policy of the United States” 
is to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation[.]”  Id. § 230(b)(2).  
Considering this express policy, some courts have found that “[h]olding interactive service 
providers liable for third-party communications would have chilling implications for free speech 
on the internet.”  Saponaro, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 325; see also Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 
528 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that without CDA protection, interactive computer services would 
either have to “employ an army of highly-trained monitors to patrol” its services, or “shut down” 
internet forums altogether).7 
 
7 The Court recognizes that on May 28, 2020, President Donald J. Trump issued an Executive 
Order relating to Section 230(c) (the “Executive Order”), which appears to be directed at preventing 
censorship by online platforms such as the moving Defendants in this case.  See Executive Order On 
Preventing Online Censorship, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-
order-preventing-online-censorship/ (last accessed June 4, 2020).  The Policy section of the Executive 
Order states, in part: 
In a country that has long cherished the freedom of expression, we cannot allow a limited 
number of online platforms to hand pick the speech that Americans may access and convey 
on the internet.  This practice is fundamentally un-American and anti-democratic.  
* * * 
Online platforms are engaging in selective censorship that is harming our national 
discourse.  Tens of thousands of Americans have reported, among other troubling 
behaviors, online platforms “flagging” content as inappropriate, even though it does not 
violate any stated terms of service; making unannounced and unexplained changes to 
company policies that have the effect of disfavoring certain viewpoints; and deleting 
content and entire accounts with no warning, no rationale, and no recourse. 
Id. § 1. Policy. 
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B. Defendants Meet the Criteria for Immunity under the CDA 
“The elements required for Section 230(c) immunity are: (1) that the defendant is a 
provider or user of an ‘interactive computer service;’ (2) that the asserted claims treat the 
defendant as the publisher or speaker of the information; and (3) that the information is provided 
by another ‘information content provider.’”  Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 838 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)); see also Dimeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
First, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit are all 
providers of an “interactive computer service,” as defined in § 230(f)(2).  (See generally ECF 
Nos. 58 at 12-15, 60 at 11-15, 61 at 2-5.)  The CDA defines an “interactive computer service” as 
“any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server[.]”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).  Here, all three 
Defendants fall squarely within that definition as providers of a website or social media platform, 
namely, “Facebook owns and operates . . . one of the world’s largest social media internet 
sites[,]” “Imgur is an internet-based online image-sharing business[,]” and “Reddit is an 
American social news aggregation company[.]”  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 21.)  Furthermore, this 
Court agrees with the other courts that have held that same or similar social media platforms fit 
the definition of an “interactive computer service” provider.  See, e.g., Shulman v. 
Facebook.com, No. 17-764, 2018 WL 3344236, at *7 (D.N.J. July 9, 2018) (concluding that 
Facebook is an interactive computer service); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp.3d 1116, 1121 
 
The Executive Order is the subject of a lawsuit filed June 2, 2020, which alleges that the 
Executive Order violates the First Amendment and “seeks to curtail and chill the constitutionally 
protected speech of all online platforms and individuals.”  See Complaint, Ctr. for Democracy & 
Tech. v. Donald J. Trump, No. 20-1456-TNM (D.D.C. June 2, 2020), ECF No. 1.  Having reviewed the 
Executive Order and the context in which it was issued, the Court finds that it does not alter the 
Court’s analysis of the CDA immunity issue in this case. 
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(N.D. Cal. 2016) (noting that Twitter is an interactive computer service provider); Marfione v. 
KAI U.S.A., Ltd., No. 17-70, 2018 WL 1519042, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2018) (finding 
Instagram an interactive computer service); see also Mmubango v. Google, Inc., No. 12-1300, 
2013 WL 664231, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2013) (“Google is an interactive computer service 
provider.”).   
Second, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for information provided by another 
information content provider.  Under the statute, an “‘information content provider’ means any 
person or entity that is responsible . . . for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  “If a 
defendant did not create or author the statement in controversy, but rather is provided that 
statement by a third-party information content provider, then that defendant cannot be held liable 
under the CDA.”  Mmubango, 2013 WL 664231, at *2 (holding that the CDA immunizes the 
defendant against the plaintiff’s claims for defamation and negligence).  Here, Plaintiff does not 
explicitly allege that Facebook, Imgur, or Reddit created or developed the offending content (i.e., 
postings, advertisements, and short-looping videos that utilized Plaintiff’s image).  Rather, it is 
reasonable to infer from the allegations in the Amended Complaint, and the exhibits attached 
thereto, that Defendants merely allowed the offending content to be posted on their respective 
platforms via third-party users.  (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-48; see also Ex.’s L-N.)  
Lastly, Plaintiff’s claims seek to treat each Defendant as a “publisher or speaker” of the 
content posted by third parties.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  “The Third Circuit has held the CDA 
immunizes traditional publisher conduct, such as ‘deciding whether to publish, withdraw, or alter 
content.’”  Obado v. Magedson, No. 13-2382, 2014 WL 3778261, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014) 
(citing Green, 318 F.3d at 471).  For the Defendants here, such decisions “involve deciding 
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whether to provide access to third-party content or whether to delete the content from [their] 
archiv[e] or cache.”  Mmubango, at *2.  Thus, because Plaintiff’s claims are premised on third-
party-posted content that were hosted on each Defendants’ respective platforms, these claims are 
not actionable under § 230. 
In summary, the Court finds that Defendants meet the criteria for immunity under § 230 
of the CDA.  
C. Plaintiff’s Right of Publicity Claims Do Not Qualify for the “Any Law 
Pertaining to Intellectual Property” Exclusion 
With respect to the CDA’s exclusion for “any law pertaining to intellectual property[,]” 
the Court recognizes there that there is a split of authority over the scope of this exclusion.  See 
47 U.S.C. §230(e)(2).  Specifically, there is disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and some 
district courts over whether the CDA preempts state law intellectual property claims.  Compare, 
e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
CDA preempted a state right of publicity claim); Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. 
Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We have observed before that 
because Congress did not define the term ‘intellectual property law,’ it should be construed 
narrowly to advance the CDA’s express policy of providing broad immunity.”); with Doe v. 
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008) (holding that the CDA did 
not preempt plaintiff’s right of publicity claim); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, 
Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Section 230(c)(1) does not provide immunity 
for either federal or state intellectual property claims.”).8  Plaintiff relies primarily upon the 
 
8 Moreover, the Court’s research has yielded no case law from any other appellate courts that has 
clearly resolved whether the CDA preempts right of publicity claims.  See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 26 n.9 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting the split of authority over whether the 
CDA preempts right of publicity claims but not taking a position where plaintiffs’ claims failed otherwise 
on the merits); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing but not 
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decision in Atlantic Recording Corp. to argue that her right of publicity claims are not preempted 
by the CDA.  (See ECF Nos. 58 at 13-14, 60 at 12-13, 61 at 3-4.)  However, for the reasons 
discussed further below, the Court declines to follow the district court opinion in Atlantic 
Recording Corp., and instead finds that the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 is more 
consistent with the statutory text and purpose of § 230(c). 
In Perfect 10, a magazine publisher sued an online credit card processing company.  
Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1108.  Claiming that the defendant improperly used the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted images, the plaintiff brought several state intellectual property claims, including an 
alleged violation of the right of publicity.  Id.  The defendant raised § 230 as a defense to this 
claim, but the district court summarily denied immunity.  Id.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and held that the defendant was entitled to § 230 immunity against plaintiff’s right of 
publicity claim, stating that the term ‘intellectual property’ is not defined in the statute, and that 
“[s]tates have any number of laws that could be characterized as intellectual property laws: 
trademark, unfair competition, dilution, right of publicity and trade defamation, to name just a 
few.”  Id. at 1107.  The court noted that “[b]ecause such laws vary widely from state to state, no 
litigant will know if he is entitled to immunity for a state claim until a court decides the legal 
issue.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that “[a]s a practical matter, inclusion of rights 
protected by state law within the ‘intellectual property’ exemption would fatally undermine the 
 
deciding the “difficult issues” of whether the CDA applies to a right of publicity claim, even though 
“there appears to be no dispute that the right of publicity is a type of intellectual property right”).  Further, 
the Court’s research has revealed no district court opinion within the Third Circuit that has squarely 
determined the issue.  See, e.g., Parker v. Paypal, No. 16-4786, 2017 WL 3508759, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 
16, 2017) (holding, without discussing § 230(e)(2), that plaintiff’s claim for right of publicity under 
California law was “clearly preempted and prohibited by § 230”); Obado, at *7 n.5 (noting the Ninth 
Circuit’s position but finding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a right of publicity violation and 
therefore it was unnecessary to decide whether the claim was excluded from CDA preemption); but see 
Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., No. 13-2477, 2013 WL 4426359, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) 
(holding plaintiff’s claim under Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute preempted by the CDA). 
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broad grant of immunity provided by the CDA.”  Id. at 1108.  The Ninth Circuit did not 
expressly find the language of § 230(e)(2) to be ambiguous.  Rather, citing § 230(a) and (b), it 
construed the term “intellectual property” in subsection (e)(2) to mean “federal intellectual 
property,” in light of “Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet 
from the various state-law regimes.”  Id. at 1118.  By contrast, the district court opinion cited by 
Plaintiff, which criticizes the Ninth Circuit, focuses solely on the language of § 230(e) and 
declines to consider the codified policy objectives.  See Atlantic Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 
2d at 703-04. 
This Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Perfect 10.  State laws that could arguably be 
construed as implicating “intellectual property” vary and are not uniform in their purposes and 
policy goals.  Conditioning CDA immunity on the diverse potentially applicable state laws 
would have a negative effect on the development of the internet, and, therefore, would run 
contrary to the purpose and intent of the CDA.  As the Ninth Circuit noted in Perfect 10: 
While the scope of federal intellectual property law is relatively 
well-established, state laws protecting “intellectual property,” 
however defined, are by no means uniform. Such laws may bear 
various names, provide for varying causes of action and remedies, 
and have varying purposes and policy goals. Because material on a 
website may be viewed across the Internet, and thus in more than 
one state at a time, permitting the reach of any particular state's 
definition of intellectual property to dictate the contours of this 
federal immunity would be contrary to Congress's expressed goal 
of insulating the development of the Internet from the various 
state-law regimes. 
 
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118; see also Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 F.3d 
1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016) (“When deciding whether a class of people qualify for immunity 
from suit, we look for that intent to be expressed in an explicit statutory or constitutional 
guarantee of immunity.” (citing Szehinkyzj v. Attorney Gen., 432 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2005))).  
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In this Court’s view, construing § 230(e)(2) as preserving only federal intellectual property 
claims is most fitting because this interpretation simultaneously maintains broad immunity in 
line with the CDA’s stated congressional purpose.  This preserves the scope of immunity within 
a predictable body of federal law as opposed to the diverse state law on the subject matter.  See 
Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 946 F.3d at 1053 (holding “that the intellectual property 
exception contained in § 230(e)(2) encompasses claims pertaining to an established intellectual 
property right under federal law, like those inherent in a patent, copyright, or trademark”).    
Accordingly, the Court holds that only federal intellectual property claims are excluded 
from the scope of CDA immunity, and for this reason, Plaintiff’s statutory and common law right 
of publicity claims are barred by § 230(c) of the CDA.9 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the respective Motions of 
Defendants Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit.  An appropriate Order will follow. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 /s/ John Milton Younge   
Judge John Milton Younge 
 
9 The Court recognizes that Defendants advance other arguments under Fed. R. 12(b)(6); 
however, given that the Court concludes Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the CDA, the Court need not 
address these additional arguments.  
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
KAREN HEPP,    :     
      :  
Plaintiff   : 
      : CIVIL ACTION 
v.     :  
      : NO. 19-4034-JMY 
FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,  : 
      : 




AND NOW, this   5th   day of June, 2020, upon consideration of the Motions to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Imgur, Inc.; Reddit, Inc.; and Facebook, 
Inc., (see ECF Nos. 53, 54, 56), and all documents submitted in support thereof and in opposition 
thereto, it is ORDERED that:  
(1) Imgur, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 53) is GRANTED, and Imgur, Inc. is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action;  
(2) Reddit, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 54) is GRANTED, and Reddit, Inc. is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action; and 
(3) Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 56) is GRANTED, and Facebook, Inc. is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action.  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by 





1 On May 13, 2020, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Giphy from this lawsuit with prejudice.  (ECF 
No. 74.)   
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IT IS SO ORDERED.  
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 /s/ John Milton Younge    
Judge John Milton Younge 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
KAREN HEPP,    :     
      :  
Plaintiff   : 
      : CIVIL ACTION 
v.     :  
      : NO. 19-4034-JMY 
FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,  : 
      : 




YOUNGE, J.            AUGUST   3 , 2020  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case arises out of an allegedly unauthorized photograph of Plaintiff Karen Hepp, 
which was captured by a security camera in a New York City convenience store and then was 
posted by third-party users on several websites and social media platforms, including that of 
Defendant WGCZ, S.R.O. (“WGCZ”).  (See generally, Am. Compl., ECF No. 50.)  Plaintiff 
asserts that she is a public figure who has suffered harm from the unlawful dissemination and 
publication of her image and, accordingly, she asserts claims against WGCZ for alleged violation 
of her common law and statutory right of publicity.   
 Presently before the Court is WGCZ’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.  
(WGCZ Mot., ECF No. 77.)  WGCZ argues that it should be dismissed from this action based on 
a lack of personal jurisdiction.  (Id. at 1.)  In response to WGCZ’s Motion, Plaintiff filed an 
Opposition and a Cross-Motion to Amend the Complaint to Add a Count for Successor Liability 
and to Add a Party.  (Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Mot., ECF No. 83.)  Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion seeks to add 
as an additional defendant an entity named NKL Associates, S.R.O. (“NKL”), which Plaintiff 
contends is a successor company to WGCZ.  (Id.; see also Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Mot. Mem. 2, ECF 
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No. 83-6.)  For the reasons that follow, WGCZ’s Motion will be granted, Plaintiff’s Cross-
Motion to Amend will be denied, and Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed.  
II. BACKGROUND 
 A. Factual Background1 
 Plaintiff is a newscaster who has worked for the Philadelphia-based Fox 29 news team 
since November 2010.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.)  She “is a co-anchor of the 4 am to 6 am hours of 
‘Good Day Philadelphia,’ a morning news program, and joins the set as co-host for the final hour 
of the show from 9 am to 10 am.”  (Id. ¶ 38.)  Prior to working at Fox 29, Plaintiff worked for 
other news organizations in New York City, Philadelphia, and Connecticut.  (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.)   
 Plaintiff alleges that “[a]pproximately two years ago, [she] discovered through her co-
workers and managers, that, without her consent, a photograph of her taken by a security camera 
in a convenience store in New York City was being used in online advertisements for erectile 
dysfunction and dating websites.”   (Id. ¶ 43.)  Plaintiff further alleges that she “was unaware that 
her photograph had been taken” in the store, that she “does not know the identity or the location 
of the store or how her photograph was secured,” and that she “has since learned that the 
photograph has appeared illegally on many other websites.”  (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.)  The Amended 
Complaint also references and attaches as exhibits images and internet addresses of the websites 
on which her image appeared.  (Id. ¶¶ 46-48, Exs. L-P.)  Plaintiff alleges that the unauthorized 
dissemination of her image has negatively impacted her “image/brand on social media sites” and 
her “social media ranking” on sites such as Instagram and Twitter.  (See id. ¶¶ 51-55.)  Plaintiff 
 
 1 The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are accepted as true and construed in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party.  DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262-
63 (3d Cir. 2008).    
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alleges that “Defendants’ actions with respect to [her] image have caused serious, permanent and 
irreparable harm” to “Plaintiff’s reputation, brand and image.”  (Id. ¶¶ 64, 71.)     
 With regard to moving Defendant WGCZ, Plaintiff alleges that it “is a limited liability 
company existing under the laws of the Czech Republic.”  (Id. ¶ 34.)  Plaintiff alleges that 
WGCZ “owns and operates ‘XNXX.com,’ a popular adult-oriented website featuring 
pornographic materials.”  (Id. ¶ 35.)  Plaintiff alleges that her photo “was featured on the XNXX 
site in the ‘milf’ gallery 44/46 and can be easily downloaded.  The XNXX site url address is: 
https://multi.xnxx.com/gallery/1116129/a34b/milf_gallery_44_46/.”2  (Id. ¶ 50, Ex. P.)  Review 
of Exhibit P indicates that the Plaintiff’s photograph was posted on XNXX.com by a third party 
or parties.  (Id. Ex P.)  Specifically, Exhibit P states:  “Photos uploaded to: xnxx.com / forum by 
endzeitH - NylonLuver - DebbyLynn - Ginger Snap - easytiger511111.”  (Id.)  The screenshot 
depicted in Exhibit P is undated and contains nothing to establish when it was uploaded to 
XNXX.com.  (Id.)  Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege, either in her Amended Complaint or in 
her Opposition and Cross-Motion to Amend, that WGCZ or NKL authored, created, or 
developed the photograph of Plaintiff that is the subject of this lawsuit.  (See generally, Am. 
Compl.; see also Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Mot. Mem. at 6 (stating that WGCZ “provid[es] an interactive 
pornographic website that allows users to download millions of pornographic images and 
videos. . . .” (emphasis added).))   
 B. Procedural History 
 Plaintiff filed this action on September 4, 2019, asserting in her original Complaint 
claims against Facebook, Inc.; Imgur, Inc.; Reddit, Inc.; Giphy, Inc.; WGCZ; and Does 1-10, for 
 
 2 The Amended Complaint alleges that “milf” is “a derogatory and degrading slang acronym that 
refers to a sexually attractive woman with young children.”  (Am. Compl. ¶ 47.)   
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violation of 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I), and under the Pennsylvania 
common law right of publicity (Count II).3   (Compl., ECF No. 1.)  Subsequently, Defendants 
Imgur, Giphy, Reddit, and Facebook filed motions to dismiss the Complaint.  (See ECF Nos. 29, 
45, 46, 47.)  When the motions to dismiss the original Complaint were filed, Plaintiff had not yet 
demonstrated proof of service of the Complaint on WGCZ.  (See ECF Nos. 34, 43.)  Plaintiff 
later effected service on WGCZ pursuant to the Hague Convention, and WGCZ’s counsel 
executed a waiver of service.  (See ECF Nos. 52, 68.) 
 On February 18, 2020, while the other Defendants’ motions to dismiss the original 
Complaint were pending, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint, again asserting claims against 
all of the above-noted Defendants under 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I), and 
the Pennsylvania common law right of publicity (Count II).  (See generally Am. Compl.)  
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the motions to dismiss the original Complaint as moot.  (See 
ECF No. 51.)  On March 3, 2020, Defendants Imgur, Reddit, Giphy, and Facebook filed motions 
to dismiss the Amended Complaint.  (ECF Nos. 53-56.)  Subsequently, Plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed her claims against Giphy with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(a)(1)(A)(i).  (ECF No. 74.)  On June 5, 2020, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order 
granting the motions to dismiss filed by Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit, and dismissing Plaintiff’s 
action as to those Defendants with prejudice.  (6/5/20 Mem., ECF No. 81; 6/5/20 Order, ECF No. 
82.)  In granting these motions to dismiss, the Court concluded that Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit 
 
 3 Plaintiff alleges that the Doe Defendants are “the owners and operators of other websites and/or 
media outlets” who either performed the acts alleged, “acted as agents, principals, alter egos, employees, 
or representatives of the other Defendants,” or “otherwise participated in the acts alleged with the other 
Defendants.”  (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.)  Plaintiff has not yet identified or served the Doe Defendants.   
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are entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Section 230(c) of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  (See 6/5/20 Mem. at 2, 8-10.)  
 Shortly before the Court issued its June 5, 2020 Memorandum and Order, WGCZ filed 
the Motion to Dismiss that is currently before the Court.  (See WGCZ Mot.)  Plaintiff filed her 
Opposition and Cross-Motion on June 11, 2020, and, on June 18, 2020, WGCZ filed a Reply in 
support of its Motion and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion.  (ECF No. 84.)    
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
 A. Personal Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(2) 
 In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a court “must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true and 
construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.”  Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 
368 (3d Cir. 2002).  If no evidentiary hearing is held on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need 
only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.  Miller Yacht Sales, Inc., v. Smith, 384 
F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004).  A plaintiff has the burden to establish “with reasonable particularity 
sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.”  Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat. 
Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Action Mfg. Co. v. Simon 
Wrecking Co., 375 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (A plaintiff satisfies this prima 
facie standard by presenting facts that, if true, would permit the court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over defendant.). 
 However, when a defendant challenges a court’s personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must 
then establish its existence.  O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 
2007).  The plaintiff meets this burden by “establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient 
contacts between the defendant and the forum state to support jurisdiction.”  Provident Nat’l 
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Bank v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987).  The plaintiff 
may not “rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand a defendant’s . . . motion to 
dismiss” for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 
F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984).  Instead, the “plaintiff must respond with actual proofs, not mere 
allegations.”  Id. 
 A federal court entertaining a suit must possess one of two forms of personal jurisdiction 
over each defendant. The first form, known as specific jurisdiction, requires that the plaintiff’s 
claim arise from the defendant’s contacts with the forum in which the court sits.  Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984).  In contrast, the court may 
exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant who possesses systematic and continuous contacts 
with the forum regardless of whether the plaintiff’s claim derives from the defendant’s in-forum 
activities.  Id. at 415 n.9; see also Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d 2007).  The court 
must determine whether to exercise either form of jurisdiction in light of the “relationship among 
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. 
 “[S]pecifc jurisdiction exists when the claim arises from or relates to conduct purposely 
directed at the forum state.”  Marten, 499 F.3d at 296.  Determining whether specific jurisdiction 
exists involves a three-part inquiry.  O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317.  First, the defendant must have 
“‘purposefully directed’ his activities” at the forum.  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462 (1985).  Second, the plaintiff’s claim must “arise out of or relate to” at least one of those 
specific activities.  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.  Third, courts may consider additional factors 
to ensure that the assertion of jurisdiction otherwise “comport[s] with ‘fair play and substantial 
justice.’”  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.  “There must be a ‘deliberate targeting of the forum’ 
and ‘contacts with a state’s citizens that take place outside the state are not purposeful contacts 
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with the state itself.’”  Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 455, 463-464 (E.D. Pa. 2019) 
(quoting O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317).  “Moreover, ‘the defendant must have purposefully 
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum.’”  Id. at 464 (quoting 
O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (alteration in original)). 
 In cases where the alleged wrongdoing sounds in tort, the personal jurisdiction inquiry 
employs an effects test to determine whether purposeful direction exists.  Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783 (1984).  Under this test, personal jurisdiction can be based on:  (1) an intentional tort; 
(2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered — and 
which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered — in the forum state.  See  IMO Indus., Inc., 
v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-266 (3d Cir. 1998); Lutz, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 466.  Only if the 
“expressly aimed” element of the effects test is met does the court need to consider the other two 
elements.  Marten, 499 F.3d at 297. 
 B. Leave to Amend Under Rule 15(a) 
 The Plaintiff moves to amend her Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(a), which states that “leave [to amend a pleading] shall be freely given when 
justices so requires.”  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) has been interpreted to liberally 
allow for the amendment of pleadings when justice so requires; however, this privilege is not 
unfettered.  Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).  Under certain circumstances, the denial 
of a motion to amend is appropriate.  Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984).  
“Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, 
dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility.”  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 
1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).  In “assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies the same standard of 
legal sufficiency” used in 12(b)(6) motions.  Id.  Accordingly, the court must “accept as true all 
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the facts alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them,” 
and deny a motion to amend only “where it is certain that no relief could be granted under any 
set of facts that could be proved.”  Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 
1990).   
IV. DISCUSSION 
 A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over WGCZ4   
  1. The Parties’ Arguments 
 As a threshold matter, WGCZ argues that it is not subject to specific jurisdiction because 
it did not own or operate the XNXX.com website when the offending photograph of Plaintiff was 
displayed on that site.  (WGCZ Mem. at 7.)  Putting ownership of the website to one side, 
WGCZ also contends that specific jurisdiction is lacking because:  (1) Plaintiff has not alleged 
that WGCZ committed any acts aimed or purposely directed to Pennsylvania; (2) Plaintiff has 
not alleged that her claims arise out of or relate to WGCZ’s contacts with Pennsylvania; and (3) 
exercising jurisdiction over WGCZ “would be unreasonable and would fail to ‘comport with fair 
play and substantial justice.’”  (WGCZ Mem. 6-8 (quoting Lutz, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 464).)   
 In support of its arguments, WGCZ offers the Declaration of Robert Seifert, the 
administrative director for both WGCZ and NKL.  (Seifert Decl. ¶¶ 1, 9, ECF No. 77-2.)  Seifert 
states that “WGCZ does not own or operate the website XNXX.com, or any other websites 
mentioned in the [A]mended [C]omplaint,” and it has not owned or operated XNXX.com since 
 
 4 Plaintiff does not contend that WGCZ is subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.  (See 
Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Motion Mem. at 3-4; see also WGCZ Mem. 5-6, ECF No. 77-1.)  The Court agrees that 
no basis exists to conclude that WGCZ “maintained systematic and continuous contacts with 
[Pennsylvania]” as necessary to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.  Marten, 499 F.3d at 296. 
.   
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May of 2014, when WGCZ transferred ownership and operation of the site to NKL.  (Id. ¶¶ 4, 
10, 11.)  Seifert further attests that: 
WGCZ never has had and does not now have an office in Pennsylvania, and it is 
not registered to do business in Pennsylvania.  WGCZ has no Pennsylvania-based 
business operations, no Pennsylvania employees, owns no Pennsylvania property, 
rents no Pennsylvania property, and pays no Pennsylvania state taxes.  WGCZ does 
not hold any Pennsylvania bank accounts, has no Pennsylvania mailing address or 
phone numbers, and does not have any designated agents residing in, domiciled in, 
or doing business from Pennsylvania.  WGCZ also does not sell products or provide 
any services intentionally directed or aimed at Pennsylvania.  None of WGCZ’s 
officers or directors reside in or are domiciled in Pennsylvania. . . . WGCZ has 
never filed a lawsuit in Pennylvania, nor has it sought the protection of any 
Pennsylvania laws. 
 
(Id. ¶¶ 5-6.)  Finally, Seifert states that:  WGCZ “did not expressly aim or purposefully direct 
any conduct relating to the [A]mended [C]omplaint toward Pennsylvania or any Pennsylvania 
resident. . . . WGCZ has not purposefully availed itself of the benefits or protections of the laws 
of Pennsylvania; WGCZ does not operate any servers in Pennsylvania; . . . WGCZ has not 
received any revenue from any website, photograph or image at issue in this case, and . . . 
WGCZ has no physical or business presence in Pennsylvania.”  (Id. ¶¶ 11.) 
 Plaintiff, in turn, argues that specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate based on 
WGCZ’s internet presence and based on the theory that WGCZ purposefully availed itself of the 
benefits and privileges of conducting business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  (Pl.’s 
Opp./Cross-Mot. Mem. at 4-7.)  In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to Ackourney v. 
Sonallas Custom Tailors, 573 F. App’x 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2014), and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo 
Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  These cases stand for the 
proposition that specific jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant that establishes 
minimum contact with a forum through cyberspace based commercial activities over the internet.  
Ackourney, 573 F. App’x at 211; Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123-24.   
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  2. Plaintiff Fails to Plausibly Allege Specific Jurisdiction Over WGCZ 
 Plaintiff’s jurisdictional arguments as to WGCZ lack merit for two related reasons.  First, 
Plaintiff fails to identify plausible allegations or evidence to suggest that XNXX.com was owned 
or operated by WGCZ when the allegedly offending conduct occurred.  Plaintiff cannot establish 
specific jurisdiction as to WGCZ if it did not own or operate XNXX.com during the relevant 
time period because, a fortiori, if it did not own or operate the site, WGCZ would not be 
responsible for purposely directing the offending content to Pennsylvania.   
 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff merely alleges that WGCZ was organized under the 
laws of the Czech Republic and that it owns and operates XNXX.com.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.)  
However, according to the Seifert Declaration, XNXX.com has not been owned or operated by 
WGCZ since May of 2014.  (Seifert Decl. ¶ 10.)  WGCZ also produced a copy of the Terms of 
Service for XNXX.com, which identify NKL as the owner and operator of XNXX.com.  (Id., Ex. 
A.)  Plaintiff herself relies upon a World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) arbitration 
decision filed on April 28, 2020, in NKL Associates S.R.O. v. WhoisGuard Protected, 
WhoisGuard, Inc. / James Andrade, Case No. D2020-0662.  (Pl.’s Opp./Cross Mot. Ex. C, ECF 
No. 83-4.)  However, this decision identifies NKL as the owner and operator of XNXX.com.  
 Plaintiff also cites to a WIPO arbitration decision in WGCZ S.R.O. v. Whois Privacy 
Services Pty Ltd./Murat Yikilmaz, Case No. D2014-0492.   (Id., Ex. A, ECF No. 83-2.)  
However, this WIPO decision was issued on June 17, 2014, and it pertains to a domain name 
dispute that arose from events that transpired well before May of 2014, when, according to 
Seifert, NKL assumed ownership and operation of XNXX.com.  (Id.)  This decision does nothing 
to contradict the Seifert Declaration and does not establish WGCZ’s ownership or control over 
XNXX.com after May of 2014.  In short, Plaintiff has not identified any credible evidence to 
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counter the Seifert Declaration, nor any evidence to indicate that WGCZ owned or operated 
XNXX.com at the time when Plaintiff’s image appeared on that site.   
 Plaintiff’s reliance on the sliding scale internet test is similarly misplaced.  (See Pl.’s 
Opp./Cross-Mot. Mem. 4-6 (citing Ackourney, 573 F. App’x at 211; Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123-
24 (W.D. Pa. 1997).)   Under this test, courts assess whether the defendant established minimum 
contacts through cyberspace.  Ackourney, 573 F. App’x at 211.  Courts conducting this 
assessment must look to the “nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts 
over the internet.”  Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.  The court must examine “the level of 
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the website.”  
Id.  A passive website that does little more than make information available to those who are 
interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  Ackourney, 573 App’x at 
212.  The middle ground is occupied by interactive websites where a user can exchange 
information with the host computer.  In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by 
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that 
occurs on the website.  Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 Plaintiff alleges that WGCZ has purposely availed itself of the benefits and privileges of 
conducting business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by maintaining a website that offers 
a high degree of interactivity.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 4 (“[A]ll Defendants purposely avail themselves of 
conducting activities within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and their respective websites 
actively engage Pennsylvania-based users and offer a high degree of interactivity with same.”).)  
Plaintiff argues that specific jurisdiction is proper because WGCZ has a vast internet business 
that reaches into the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Plaintiff cites to the existence of 
XNXX.com as the foundation for her argument.  Plaintiff argues that XNXX.com is the “181st 
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most visited site globally, the 157th most visited site in the United States, and receives about 
16.3 million unique visitors per month in the United States.”  (Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Motion at 5.)  
Plaintiff points to this internet presence and argues that WGCZ has Pennsylvania customers who 
uploaded and downloaded millions of pornographic images and videos.  (Id. at 6.)  Critically, 
however, this argument ignores the absence of any evidence that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of or 
relate to WGCZ’s alleged internet presence with respect to XNXX.com., which according to the 
unrebutted Seifert Declaration, was owned and operated by another entity, NKL.  WGCZ’s 
operation of other allegedly interactive websites does not support personal jurisdiction in this 
case because Plaintiff’s claims do not arise out of and are not related to those alleged websites.  
Plaintiff’s argument does not satisfy the requirement that specific personal jurisdiction exists 
only if the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s specific activities.  
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.   
  3. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Jurisdictional Discovery 
 Plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery because she has failed to plausibly 
plead facts or identify any evidence to make a threshold showing that specific personal 
jurisdiction exists over WGCZ.  Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that support 
personal jurisdiction.  Pinker, 292 F.3d at 368.  Jurisdictional discovery is proper if the plaintiff 
has made a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists.  Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, 
S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003).  To satisfy this showing, Plaintiff must present “factual 
allegations that suggest ‘with reasonable particularity’ the possible existence of the requisite 
‘contacts between [the party] and the forum state,’”  Id. at 456.  If a plaintiff presents factual 
allegations that satisfy this standard, “the plaintiff’s right to conduct jurisdictional discovery 
should be sustained.’”  Id.  However, the Third Circuit has also held that “a mere unsupported 
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allegation that the defendant ‘transacts business’ in an area is ‘clearly frivolous”’ for purposes of 
determining whether jurisdictional discovery is warranted.  Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. 
Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s denial of 
jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff merely averred that defendant conducted business in the 
forum). 
 The allegation that WGCZ conducts business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
amounts to nothing more than a bare allegation that cannot support a request to conduct 
jurisdictional discovery.  Id.  As noted above, Plaintiff’s allegations related to WGCZ’s 
ownership and operation of XNXX.com are unsubstantiated in the record.  Plaintiff offers no 
explanation of how jurisdictional discovery will reveal the requisite contacts or purposely 
directed activities necessary to establish specific jurisdiction over WGCZ.  Bare allegations, 
without factual support, are insufficient to permit Plaintiff to conduct a fishing expedition under 
the guise of jurisdictional discovery.  Crockett v. Luitpold Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 19-0276, 
2020 WL 3096527, at *5 n.6 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2020); Katz v. DNC Serv. Corp., No. 16-5800, 
2017 WL 5885672, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2017) (denying a request for jurisdictional discovery 
where plaintiff failed to meet its burden of making out a threshold prima facie case of personal 
jurisdiction); Kalon v. Koresko Fin. LP, No. 14-5216, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 64116, at *12 n.8 
(E.D. Pa. 2020) (denying request for jurisdiction discovery); See Barth v. Walt Disney Parks & 
Resorts U.S., Inc., 697 F. App’x 119, 120 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of request where 
“jurisdictional discovery would have been futile”).  
 WGCZ is a foreign defendant and it should not be subject to the burden of conducting 
unnecessary and costly discovery in the United States without some showing on the part of 
Plaintiff that such discovery is warranted. 
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 C. Plaintiff’s Proposed Amendment Is Futile 
 
 Plaintiff seeks to amend her Amended Complaint to “add a count for successor liability 
and to add NKL as a party[.]”  (Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Mot. at 2.)  As noted above, the Court 
previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit based on immunity 
under CDA § 230(c).  A review of the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto reflects that NKL 
would likewise be entitled to immunity for the claims asserted in this action based on its 
ownership and operation of XNXX.com.  (Seifert Decl. ¶ 10; see also Am. Compl. Ex. P.)  
Plaintiff describes XNXX.com as an “interactive platform by which Pennsylvanians upload and 
download millions of pornographic images and videos.”  (Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Motion at 6.)  
Interactive websites and social media platforms are entitled to immunity under § 230(c) for 
content provided by third parties.  Review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Exhibit P 
reflects that Plaintiff’s photograph was posted on XNXX.com by an individual, or individuals, 
under the screen name(s) “endzeitH – NylonLuver - DebbyLynn – Ginger Snap – 
easytiger511111.”  (Am. Compl. Ex. P.)  Immunity under § 230(c) applies when a third-party 
places content on an interactive website or social media platform.  (See 6/5/20 Mem.)  Because 
NKL is entitled to immunity under CDA § 230(c), further amendment of Plaintiff’s pleadings 
would be futile.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, WGCZ’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted, Plaintiff’s claims 
against WGCZ will be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s Amended 
Complaint will be dismissed.5  Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Amend her pleading to add NKL as a 
defendant will be denied because the proposed amendment is futile. 
 An appropriate order follows.   
 
      BY THE COURT: 
 
      _/s/ John Milton Younge___________ 
      Judge John Milton Younge 
 
 5 Having dismissed Plaintiff's claims against all named Defendants, Plaintiff's remaining claims 
exist solely against Doe Defendants.  See Mcginty v. Brennan, No. 15-6855, 2017 WL 1536417, at *3 n.6 
(D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2017) (citing Baker v. United States, 642 Fed. App’x. 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Case law 
is clear that an action cannot be maintained solely against Doe defendants.”); Breslin v. Philadelphia, 92 
F.R.D. 764, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“Given the identification of the remaining defendants only as ‘John 
Doe,’ there is no method of serving the complaint in accord with due process, and no way that the action 
can otherwise proceed.”)).  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety.  
Id. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
KAREN HEPP,    :     
      :  
Plaintiff   : 
      : CIVIL ACTION 
v.     :  
      : NO. 19-4034-JMY 
FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,  : 
      : 




AND NOW, this   3rd    day of August, 2020, upon consideration of Defendant WGCZ, 
S.R.O.’s (“WGCZ”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 77), Plaintiff’s 
Opposition to WGCZ’s Motion and Cross-Motion to Amend the Complaint to Add a Count for 
Successor Liability and to Add a Party (ECF No. 83), and all documents submitted in support 
thereof and in opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that:  
1. Defendant WGCZ’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 77) is GRANTED and WGCZ 
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action. 
2. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Amend the Complaint to Add a Count for Successor 
Liability and to Add a Party (ECF No. 83) is DENIED. 
3. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.1  
 
1 Having dismissed Plaintiff's claims against all named Defendants, Plaintiff's remaining claims 
exist solely against Doe Defendants.  See Mcginty v. Brennan, No. 15-6855, 2017 WL 1536417, at *3 n.6 
(D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2017) (citing Baker v. United States, 642 Fed. App’x. 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Case law 
is clear that an action cannot be maintained solely against Doe defendants.”); Breslin v. Philadelphia, 92 
F.R.D. 764, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“Given the identification of the remaining defendants only as ‘John 
Doe,’ there is no method of serving the complaint in accord with due process, and no way that the action 
can otherwise proceed.”)).  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.  Id. 
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4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED TO CLOSE THIS CASE. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 /s/ John Milton Younge    
Judge John Milton Younge 
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